Group consumption, free-riding, and informal reciprocity agreements

被引:6
|
作者
Borcherding, TE [1 ]
Filson, D [1 ]
机构
[1] Claremont Grad Univ, Sch Polit & Econ, Dept Econ, Claremont, CA 91711 USA
关键词
club; institution; non-market; reciprocal; social capital;
D O I
10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00206-2
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We examine conditions under which group consumption is likely to involve informal reciprocity agreements rather than a price system. Our model shows that reciprocity agreements are used when transactions costs are high, the good is inexpensive, demand is inelastic, the group continues to interact over time, the consumers are patient, the time between interactions is short, and the group is small and homogencous. Further, the results suggest that reciprocity agreements are likely to involve goods that are consumed along with other group benefits, such as companionship. We use the model to analyze overlapping social networks and investments in social capital. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:237 / 257
页数:21
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