Investors Behaviour and Information Asymmetry: an Experimental Research in Iran

被引:0
|
作者
Talebnia, Ghodratollah [1 ]
Poorzamani, Zahra [1 ]
Yaghoobnezhad, Ahmad [1 ]
Bayat, Ali [1 ]
机构
[1] Islamic Azad Univ, Dept Accounting, Sci & Res Branch, Tehran, Iran
关键词
Voluntary disclosure; decision styles; lens processing model; information Asymmetry; DISCLOSURE; MARKET; POLICY; COST; ASK;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
Q [生物科学];
学科分类号
07 ; 0710 ; 09 ;
摘要
Voluntary disclosure reduces information asymmetry between investors and stakeholders. In this study, to evaluate different decision-making styles, a cognitive and behavioural model is used. The field of this research are in the Processing "Brunswick Leans Model" is placed in behavioural accounting. This research uses a quasi-experimental method. The research is conducted in 2012 in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE.). For purposes of this study, an Experimental group (176 respondents) and a control group (158 respondents) in is divided into four new ones, which represent the four dominant styles of decision-making, namely directive, analytical, conceptual, and behavioural. As an addition, investors are divided according to their brains' dominant style of decision-making and cognitive complexity so that uncertainties about the tolerance level are classified. Evidence shows that those who have their left brain as more dominant are likely to use more items, on average, to process information. As an addition, Behavioural decision-making style uses lowest items to process information than other styles. Indeed, the results show that all styles in the Experimental group have less information asymmetry than the control group. These findings support the voluntary disclosure of information by companies to reduce the level of information asymmetry that the market offers. [Ghodratollah Talebnia; Zahra Poorzamani; Ahmad Yaghoobnezhad; Ali Bayat. Investors Behaviour and Information Asymmetry: an Experimental Research in Iran. Life Sci J 2012;9(4):447-457] (ISSN:1097-8135). http://www.lifesciencesite.com. 67
引用
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页码:447 / 457
页数:11
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