Comparative analysis of multi-item online auctions: evidence from the laboratory

被引：23
|
作者：
Bapna, R
Goes, P
Gupta, A
机构：
[1] Univ Connecticut, Sch Business Adm, Dept Operat & Informat Management, Storrs, CT 06269 USA
[2] Northeastern Univ, Boston, MA 02115 USA
来源：
DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS | 2001年 / 32卷 / 02期
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
online auctions; electronic commerce; laboratory experimentation; CRM;
D O I：
10.1016/S0167-9236(01)00107-5
中图分类号：
TP18 [人工智能理论];
学科分类号：
081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;
摘要：
The dynamics of customer relationship are being reshaped by price-setting processes such as online auctions. This paper analyzes price setting process in business-to-consumer (B2C) online auctions. Typically, these auctions involve multiple identical units and utilize a variant of the traditional English-auction mechanism. We describe an online laboratory experiment that compares the efficiency of such a mechanism with a multi-item version of Vickrey's [Journal of Finance 41 (1961) 8.] second-price auction with respect to both seller's revenue and allocative efficiency. Our results reject the revenue equivalence principle and indicate that English auctions may dominate the Vickrey auctions. However, we observe that the allocative efficiency of Vickrey auctions is higher than the English auctions. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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页码：135 / 153
页数：19
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