Taxes and the backdating of stock option exercise dates

被引:24
|
作者
Dhaliwal, Dan [2 ]
Erickson, Merle [3 ]
Heitzman, Shane [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Rochester, William E Simon Grad Sch Business Adm, Rochester, NY 14627 USA
[2] Univ Arizona, Eller Coll Management, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA
[3] Univ Chicago, Grad Sch Business, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
来源
JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS | 2009年 / 47卷 / 1-2期
关键词
Stock option compensation; Backdating; Taxes; Insider trading; Regulation; INTERNAL CONTROL; COMPENSATION; AWARDS; INFORMATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.09.004
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We investigate the backdating of stock option exercises. Before SOX, we find evidence that some exercises were backdated to days with low stock prices. Consistent with a tax-based incentive, these suspect exercises are more likely when the personal tax savings from backdating are higher. However, suspect CEO exercises generate average (median) estimated tax savings of $96,000 ($7,000). These savings appear modest relative to the costs insiders and firms face. We find that the likelihood of a suspect exercise increases in the likelihood of option grant backdating. This suggests that agency problems associated with backdating permeate option compensation in some firms. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
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页码:27 / 49
页数:23
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