Moral Hazard: German Public Opinion on the Greek Debt Crisis

被引:14
|
作者
Rathbun, Brian C. [1 ]
Powers, Kathleen E. [2 ]
Anders, Therese [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Southern Calif, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA
[2] Dartmouth Coll, Hanover, NH 03755 USA
关键词
economic attitudes; fairness; moral foundations theory; public opinion; survey; SUPPORT; PSYCHOLOGY; PREFERENCES; ATTITUDES; WAR; FOUNDATIONS; INTEGRATION; PUNISHMENT; IDENTITY; IMPACT;
D O I
10.1111/pops.12522
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
The recent Eurozone crisis and negotiations over bailout packages to Greece are more than a simple controversy about financial resources. They have a decidedly moralistic overtone. Giving more funds is thought by some to be unfair to hard-working taxpayers and does not teach Greece an important moral lesson. Yet much international political economy scholarship neglects such considerations. We build on moral psychology to understand the ethical drivers of both German support and opposition to the 2015 Greek government bailout package. We analyze original survey data to show how morality is an essential factor in Germany's hard-line approach. Our results show that caring and European attachment are associated with bailout support, while authority, national attachment, and retributive fairness drive opposition. Some morals also have boundaries: National attachment attenuates the effect of harm/care on support for foreign financial assistance but strengthens the effect of fairness on bailout opposition. Moral psychology helps us understand foreign policy but must be adapted to account for multiple potential ingroups.
引用
收藏
页码:523 / 541
页数:19
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Creditor moral hazard during the EMU debt crisis
    Bratis, Theodoros
    Laopodis, Nikiforos T.
    Kouretas, Georgios P.
    JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS INSTITUTIONS & MONEY, 2015, 39 : 122 - 135
  • [2] Moral Hazard and the Optimality of Debt
    Hebert, Benjamin
    REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 2018, 85 (04): : 2214 - 2252
  • [3] MORAL HAZARD, RENEGOTIATION AND DEBT
    DIONNE, G
    VIALA, P
    ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1994, 46 (02) : 113 - 119
  • [4] Moral hazard and debt maturity☆
    Huberman, Gur
    Repullo, Rafael
    JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION, 2025, 61
  • [5] The debt crisis of Eurozone's peripheral economies: Moral hazard and its consequences
    Baer, Werner
    Esfahani, Hadi Salehi
    QUARTERLY REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE, 2013, 53 (04): : 315 - 316
  • [6] The Greek symptom Debt, crisis and the crisis of the Left
    不详
    RADICAL PHILOSOPHY, 2013, (181): : 12 - 12
  • [7] The hazard of moral hazard: Untangling the Asian crisis
    Chang, HJ
    WORLD DEVELOPMENT, 2000, 28 (04) : 775 - 788
  • [8] Deficits and biases in the leading German press coverage of the Greek sovereign debt crisis
    Teschendorf, Victoria Sophie
    Kruss, Marwin
    Otto, Kim
    Rusch, Roman
    COMMUNICATIONS-EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATION RESEARCH, 2024, 49 (04): : 669 - 691
  • [9] Proxy Brigands and Tourists: Visualizing the Greek-German Front in the Debt Crisis
    Kalantzis, Konstantinos
    VISUAL ANTHROPOLOGY REVIEW, 2016, 32 (01) : 24 - 37
  • [10] The European Debt Crisis: The Greek Case
    Sinha, Paritosh Chandra
    JCMS-JOURNAL OF COMMON MARKET STUDIES, 2017, 55 (01) : 156 - 157