Based on dynamic gaming model of three players, the central government, the local government, and farm household, this paper analyses the behavior logics and performance of the conversion program. Conclusions are as follows: (1) The ecology-economy character of the Conversion Program leads to the fluctuations of planning acres as well as the changes of the structure compared with the central original plans; (2) The character of local government's behavior, owing to the local fiscal system, leads to acre inflation of local planning, and the over speed of carrying out, and the distortion of planning structure; (3) Returning cultivated land into economy-based forestry and returning barren hills into ecology-based forestry are the equilibrium outcomes, which can not only suit the ideas of the local government, but also hedge the risk; (4) The Conversion Program is an ecological program with high social cost. The fulfillment is relatively poor, which may also lead to hazard of grain production. A serial of public policy recommendation are suggested, such as adapting subsidy policy, correcting the agriculture structure policy of local government, and reforming the local fiscal system, in the hope of promoting the efficiency of the Conversion Program.
