Which historical epistemology? Kuhn, Feyerabend, Hacking and Bachelard's school.

For over half a century the continental tradition favored a historical method in philosophy of science, while the Anglo-American tradition promoted a logical method. In recent years this contrast has tended to lessen. On the one hand, there has been a growing interest since the 1970s in France for the analytic tradition, due to the pioneering studies of Vuillemin and Gilles-Gaston Granger On the other hand, Kuhn has brought out the philosophical relevance of history of science. This tendency takes a new turn in Feyerabend's final texts as well as in the works of Ian Hacking. The latter deliberately combines the historical instruments of the French school with the logical techniques of the North-American school. How to understand this evolution ? What directions of research does it open up ? I address these questions by way of a comparative study of some recent developments in philosophy, of science both in France and North America.