Stability of international environmental agreements: an illustration with asymmetrical countries

被引：0
|
作者：
Bahn, Olivier [1 ,2 ]
Breton, Michele [1 ,2 ]
Sbragia, Lucia [1 ,2 ]
Zaccour, Georges [1 ,2 ]
机构：
[1] Ecole Hautes Etud Commerciales, Gerad, Montreal, PQ, Canada
[2] HEC Montreal, Montreal, PQ, Canada
来源：
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN OPERATIONAL RESEARCH | 2009年 / 16卷 / 03期
基金：
加拿大自然科学与工程研究理事会;
关键词：
environment; international agreements; dynamic game; DYNAMIC GAME; POLLUTION; COOPERATION; ALLOCATION; STRATEGIES; COALITIONS; CORE;
D O I：
10.1111/j.1475-3995.2008.00678.x
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号：
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
In this paper we use a dynamic model to analyze the composition and stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) in an asymmetrical framework. Signatory countries are assumed to optimize the total welfare of the international agreement's members, while non-signatory countries optimize their own individual welfare, taking into account the dynamics of the pollution stock. Our model is calibrated using data from the MERGE climate policy assessment model. We briefly review two contrasting approaches to define stability of IEAs, and provide a numerical illustration in each case.
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页码：307 / 324
页数：18
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