Précis of Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment

This paper summarizes Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment. The book's central question is whether confident (ir)religious commitment can be rationally maintained in the face of systematic religious disagreement. Part I develops an account of the epistemic significance of disagreement and considers the implications of this account for religious belief. This part argues against the commitment of "strong conciliationists" to a rigorous form of epistemic impartiality, a commitment that underlies the strongest argument for disagreement-motivated religious skepticism. Part II considers the implications for religious commitment if the impartiality constraint favored by strong conciliationists is correct. It is argued that the commitment to epistemic impartiality does not clearly support religious skepticism. However, such a commitment does induce a thoroughgoing normative uncertainty that arguably prevents one from rationally pursuing a religious (or explicitly irreligious) way of life.