What should the idealist critique of naturalism be? Hegel, Smithson, and liberal naturalism

In this journal, Robert Smithson argues that considerations stemming from Kantian and post-Kantian idealism undermine naturalistic arguments that seek to debunk elements of the 'manifest image' in favour of the 'scientific image'. The idealist tradition, on this view, holds that philosophy's task is to uncover and clarify the principles and norms which underlie different forms of inquiry, and is thus well placed to dispel the apparent 'placement' problems that stem from the collision of our ordinary worldview with contemporary philosophical naturalism. Smithson also argues that this idealist critique of naturalism is preferable to the Liberal Naturalist critique of naturalism. In this response, I argue that Smithson's view contains a gap which the naturalist can exploit to evade idealist critique, but that a Hegelian idealism contains no such gap, making it the better idealist choice. Further, I argue that that Hegelian idealism is itself plausibly a version of liberal naturalism.