Does audit regulation improve the underlying information used by managers? Evidence from PCAOB inspection access and management forecast accuracy

被引:2
|
作者
Christensen, Brant [1 ]
Lei, Lijun [2 ]
Shu, Sydney Qing [3 ]
Thomas, Wayne [4 ]
机构
[1] Brigham Young Univ, Provo, UT 84602 USA
[2] Univ North Carolina Greensboro, Greensboro, NC USA
[3] Miami Univ, Oxford, OH USA
[4] Univ Oklahoma, Norman, OK USA
关键词
PCAOB international inspection; Voluntary disclosure; Management forecast accuracy; Audit regulation; INTERNAL CONTROL; VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE; LITIGATION RISK; MATERIALITY JUDGMENTS; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; EARNINGS FORECASTS; QUALITY; IMPACT; FIRMS; ACCOUNTABILITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.aos.2022.101403
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Survey evidence and academic research raise the possibility that audit regulation can impact not only the information contained in external financial reports but also the internal information used by manage-ment. We investigate this possibility by examining the improvement in management forecast accuracy around initiation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board's (PCAOB) international inspection program. Consistent with managers having improved information, we find that managers issue more accurate forecasts following PCAOB inspection access. Multiple additional analyses support that an improved information environment is the mechanism underlying our results, and this effect is distinct from, and incremental to, any effects of PCAOB inspection on external reporting quality. Our study provides evidence that audit regulation benefits an important internal stakeholderdmanagers. (c) 2022 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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页数:18
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