Discretion for whom? Local policies and the agency problem between politicians and care managers in Swedish social service

Research on social work's relation to local political decisions and the design of political policy documents is scarce. This paper analyses the design of local political policies for elder care in Sweden's 290 municipalities. The policies determine delegation, i.e. care managers' legal right to make decisions about the welfare services given to older people. By mapping documents for delegation, the results show that care managers' delegation varies considerably between municipalities, e.g. by the decision-making being conditioned to local political guidelines, or by consultation with a manager. The Principal Agent theory (PAT) is used to discuss the findings. Analysed through the PAT, care managers can be understood as agents set to perform tasks on behalf of the politicians. Local policies can be viewed as a tool for political control by minimising risks of unpredictability and arbitrariness in decision-making. This raises questions about the role of care managers and the extent of their professional freedom while assessing needs to ensure older people a reasonable standard of living. The results highlight the importance of accounting for the structural political context and its consequences for frontline bureaucrats. Forskning om det sociala arbetets relation till lokalpolitiska beslut och utformningen av politiska policydokument ar bristfallig. I denna artikel analyseras utformningen av lokalpolitiska policys for aldreomsorg i Sveriges 290 kommuner. Policydokumenten faststaller bistandshandlaggares delegation - deras legala beslutsfattande om bistand till aldre. Kartlaggningen och kodningen av delegationsordningarna visar att bistandshandlaggares delegation varierar avsevart mellan Sveriges kommuner, exempelvis genom att villkora att beslutsfattandet ska folja lokala riktlinjer eller foregas av samrad med en chef. Resultatet diskuteras utifran principal-agent teorin. Sett i ljuset av principal-agent teorin sa kan bistandshandlaggare betraktas som agenter - satta att utfora uppgifter pa uppdrag av lokalpolitiker. Lokala policys kan ses som ett verktyg for att mojligliggora politisk kontroll genom att minska risken for oforutsagbarhet och godtycklighet i beslutsfattandet. Detta vacker fragor om bistandshandlaggares roll och omfattningen av deras professionella frihet i att bedoma behov for att tillgodose aldre en skalig levnadsniva. Resultatet lyfter fram vikten av att synliggora den strukturella politiska kontexten och dess konsekvenser for frontlinjebyrakrater.