Service design under asymmetric service provider competition: Applications of AI services

被引:4
|
作者
Yu, Shiqiang [1 ]
Guo, Chunxiang [1 ]
机构
[1] Sichuan Univ, Business Sch, Chengdu 610065, Peoples R China
关键词
Artificial intelligence; Service design; Service competition; Service supply chain; Pricing; SUPPLY CHAIN; COORDINATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.tre.2024.103424
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Recently, with the advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) technology (e.g. ChatGPT), more enterprises are incorporating AI into their customer service to reduce costs. However, the excessive use of AI technology will also reduce consumers' satisfaction with services, and finding a balance between high -quality human service and cost-effective AI service is crucial for enterprises. To answer this question, this paper establishes a service competition model in which a service integrator (SI) procures services from an AI service provider (ASP) and a human service provider (HSP), and then combines them to offer integrated services to consumers. The findings reveal that, under certain conditions, the introduction of low-cost AI service by SI may result in increased product price. This occurs because ASP tends to set higher price for AI service to ensure its profitability per unit. When the consumer service sensitivity is moderate, SI can generate greater profits by skillfully designing blended service instead of relying on a single service. HSP encourages SI to adopt some of its competitors' AI service when the consumer service sensitivity is low, while ASP does the opposite. Interestingly, a win-win scenario emerges, where all competing service providers earn higher profits compared to offering exclusive services, and SI profits and consumer welfare are also higher. In addition, service integration is essential to increase revenue for all parties involved, but the revenue increase is the same regardless of which party performs the service integration.
引用
收藏
页数:14
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Service design under asymmetric service provider competition: Applications of AI services
    Yu, Shiqiang
    Guo, Chunxiang
    Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, 2024, 182
  • [2] Competition for the IN service provider
    Carew, J
    INTELLIGENT NETWORK '96, WORKSHOP RECORD, VOLS 1 AND 2: FREEDOM & FLEXIBILITY: REALISING THE PROMISE OF INTELLIGENT NETWORK SERVICES IN THE 90'S AND BEYOND, 1996, : 547 - 558
  • [3] Provider Competition in Infrastructure-as-a-Service
    Kuensemoeller, Joern
    Karl, Holger
    Brangewitz, Sonja
    Haake, Claus-Jochen
    2014 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SERVICES COMPUTING (SCC 2014), 2014, : 203 - 210
  • [4] Service design and price competition in business information services
    Bashyam, TCA
    OPERATIONS RESEARCH, 2000, 48 (03) : 362 - 375
  • [5] Stochastic service network design for a platooning service provider
    Scherr, Yannick Oskar
    Hewitt, Mike
    Mattfeld, Dirk Christian
    TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART C-EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES, 2022, 144
  • [6] Service outsourcing contract design under asymmetric information
    Xia, Yu
    Xie, Jiqing
    Zhang, Guangsi
    Zhu, Weijun
    INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT & DATA SYSTEMS, 2022, 122 (01) : 194 - 214
  • [7] Service Provider Competition and Pricing for Dynamic Spectrum Allocation
    Acharya, Joydeep
    Yates, Roy D.
    2009 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAME THEORY FOR NETWORKS (GAMENETS 2009), 2009, : 190 - 198
  • [8] Design contracts for pollution abatement service under asymmetric information
    Chen X.
    Yu Z.
    Li J.
    Feng J.
    Xitong Gongcheng Lilun yu Shijian/System Engineering Theory and Practice, 2020, 40 (02): : 273 - 283
  • [9] Universal Service Obligations and Competition with Asymmetric Information
    Poudou, Jean-Christophe
    Roland, Michel
    Thomas, Lionel
    B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS, 2009, 9 (01):
  • [10] Applications of emotions research to service provider management
    Hartel, CE.
    Bennett, R.
    Ganegoda, D.
    AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY, 2006, 58 : 30 - 30