R&D network formation with myopic and farsighted firms

被引:3
|
作者
Mauleon, Ana [1 ,4 ]
Sempere-Monerris, Jose J. [2 ,3 ,4 ]
Vannetelbosch, Vincent [4 ]
机构
[1] UCLouvain St Louis, CEREC, Brussels, Belgium
[2] Univ Valencia, Dept Econ Anal, Valencia, Spain
[3] Univ Valencia, ERI CES, Valencia, Spain
[4] UCLouvain, CORE LIDAM, Louvain La Neuve, Belgium
关键词
Networks; R&D collaborations; Oligopoly; Myopia; Farsightedness; STABLE COALITION STRUCTURES; DEVELOPMENT COLLABORATION; INNOVATION; KNOWLEDGE; EVOLUTION; SETS;
D O I
10.1016/j.jebo.2023.02.012
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We study the formation of R&D networks when firms can be either myopic or farsighted. Stability leads to R&D networks consisting of either asymmetric components or nearly symmetric components. Farsighted firms have in average more collaborations but myopic firms can be central for spreading the innovation. We introduce yes-firms that form links subject to the constraint of non-negative profits. Yes-firms stabilize R&D networks that maximize social welfare. Finally, the evolution of R&D networks shows that nearly symmetric R&D networks will be rapidly dismantled, socially optimal R&D networks will persist many periods, while asymmetric R&D networks will persist forever.(c) 2023 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ )
引用
收藏
页码:203 / 229
页数:27
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Network formation with myopic and farsighted players
    Chenghong Luo
    Ana Mauleon
    Vincent Vannetelbosch
    Economic Theory, 2021, 71 : 1283 - 1317
  • [2] Network formation with myopic and farsighted players
    Luo, Chenghong
    Mauleon, Ana
    Vannetelbosch, Vincent
    ECONOMIC THEORY, 2021, 71 (04) : 1283 - 1317
  • [3] Farsighted R&D networks
    Mauleon, Ana
    Sempere-Monerris, Jose J.
    Vannetelbosch, Vincent
    ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2014, 125 (03) : 340 - 342
  • [4] Myopic and farsighted stability in network formation games: an experimental study
    Mariya Teteryatnikova
    James Tremewan
    Economic Theory, 2020, 69 : 987 - 1021
  • [5] Myopic and farsighted stability in network formation games: an experimental study
    Teteryatnikova, Mariya
    Tremewan, James
    ECONOMIC THEORY, 2020, 69 (04) : 987 - 1021
  • [6] Firms' R&D dilemma:: to undertake or not to undertake R&D
    González, X
    Pazó, C
    APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS, 2004, 11 (01) : 55 - 59
  • [7] Limited Farsightedness in R&D Network Formation
    Mauleon, Ana
    Sempere-Monerris, Jose J.
    Vannetelbosch, Vincent
    DYNAMIC GAMES AND APPLICATIONS, 2023, 13 (02) : 549 - 565
  • [8] The role of spillovers in R&D network formation
    Zirulia, Lorenzo
    ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND NEW TECHNOLOGY, 2012, 21 (01) : 83 - 105
  • [9] Farsighted network formation
    Dutta, B
    Ghosal, S
    Ray, D
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY, 2005, 122 (02) : 143 - 164
  • [10] R&D agenda for European firms
    不详
    CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS, 2005, 83 (50) : 19 - 19