Aristotle's Unified Soul: The Figure-Soul Analogy and Its Context

被引:0
|
作者
Hanlon, Rory [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ N Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27599 USA
关键词
Aristotle; soul; unity; part; form; substance;
D O I
10.1353/hph.2023.a909123
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
I provide a novel interpretation of Aristotle's account of the unity of soul, treating it as resolving the apparent incompatibility of the existence of psychic parts and the soul's status as a unifying form. This incompatibility, I contend, rests on a problematic assumption: mereological actualism, or the claim that parts are actually distinct and prior to the whole. Aristotle successfully undermines actualism and formulates an alternative conception of parthood within De Anima's figure-soul analogy. As triangles are only potentially present within quadrilaterals, so lower psy-chic parts are potential parts of higher souls. This picture treats a soul not as a mere aggregate of capacities, but as essentially unified and prior to its parts. Finally, I argue that this picture can be illuminated and must be read against the background of his hylomorphic account of the unity of form given in Metaphysics H.6.
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页码:533 / 558
页数:27
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