AI and bureaucratic discretion

被引:2
|
作者
Vredenburgh, Kate [1 ]
机构
[1] London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Dept Philosophy Logic & Sci Methods, London, England
关键词
AI; discretion; organizations; STREET-LEVEL; AUTOMATION; SYSTEM;
D O I
10.1080/0020174X.2023.2261468
中图分类号
B82 [伦理学(道德学)];
学科分类号
摘要
Algorithmic decision-making has the potential to radically reshape policy-making and policy implementation. Many of the moral examinations of AI in government take AI to be a neutral epistemic tool or the value-driven analogue of a policymaker. In this paper, I argue that AI systems in public administration are often better analogised to a street-level bureaucrat. Doing so opens up a host of questions about the moral dispositions of such AI systems. I argue that AI systems in public administration often act as indifferent bureaucrats, and that this can introduce a problematic homogeneity in the moral dispositions in administrative agencies.
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页数:30
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