The importance of deposit insurance credibility

被引:4
|
作者
Bonfim, Diana [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Santos, Joao A. C. [4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Banco Portugal, Lisbon, Portugal
[2] European Cent Bank, Frankfurt, Germany
[3] Univ Catol Portuguesa, Catol Lisbon Sch Business & Econ, Lisbon, Portugal
[4] Fed Reserve Bank New York, New York, NY USA
[5] Nova Sch Business & Econ, Carcavelos, Portugal
关键词
Bank deposits; Deposit insurance; Bank runs; Market discipline; MARKET DISCIPLINE; BANK RUNS; TOO BIG; SOVEREIGN; RISK; STABILITY; BEHAVIOR; CRISIS; IMPACT; FAIL;
D O I
10.1016/j.jbankfin.2023.106916
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Sovereigns usually back up their deposit insurance arrangements to lend them credibility. When the sovereign is in distress, the credibility of deposit insurance might be threatened, with detrimental ef-fects to financial stability. We investigate the behavior of depositors during the euro area sovereign debt crisis to understand the importance of deposit insurance credibility. We find that depositors responded to foreign banks' decision to convert their subsidiaries into branches. By relocating their deposits into these newly formed branches during a period of sovereign distress, depositors became insured by a deposit in-surance scheme with a stronger fiscal backstop. These results document a novel channel through which sovereign-bank links can be reinforced during a crisis: the credibility of deposit insurance. & COPY; 2023 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ )
引用
收藏
页数:14
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