Does CEO debt-like compensation mitigate corporate social irresponsibility?

被引:1
|
作者
Chen, Long [1 ]
He, Guanming [2 ]
Krishnan, Gopal V. [3 ]
机构
[1] George Mason Univ, Sch Business, Fairfax, VA USA
[2] Univ Durham, Durham Business Sch, Durham, England
[3] Bentley Univ, Dept Accountancy, Waltham, MA USA
关键词
Debt-like compensation; corporate social irresponsibility; ESG risks; CEO incentives; NONFINANCIAL DISCLOSURE; HORIZON PROBLEM; RESPONSIBILITY; COST; REPUTATION; FIRM; PERFORMANCE; GOVERNANCE; INCENTIVES; INVESTMENT;
D O I
10.1080/01559982.2023.2195983
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Corporate social irresponsibility (CSI) is an increasingly relevant topic to today's business, as CSI may exert stronger impacts on firms than corporate social responsibility (CSR). However, little is known about mechanisms that can constrain such irresponsible actions. We examine whether CEO debt-like compensation (i.e. pension and deferred compensation granted to the CEO of a firm) mitigates CSI, which is proxied by environmental, social and governance (ESG) risk exposure. Using media coverage of ESG incidents as a measure, we find that ESG risk exposure is negatively related to CEO debt-like compensation. Furthermore, this relation is stronger when firms have higher distress risks or when CEOs have greater career concerns.
引用
收藏
页码:594 / 634
页数:41
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