From unified to specific theories of cognition

This article discusses the unity of cognitive science that seemed to emerge in the 1950s, based on the computational view of cognition. This unity would entail that there is a single set of mechanisms (i.e. algorithms) for all cognitive behavior, in particular at the level of productive human cognition as exemplified in language and reasoning. In turn, this would imply that theories in psychology, and cognitive science in general, would consist of algorithms based on symbol manipulation as found in digital compu-ting. However, a number of developments in recent decades cast doubt on this unity of cognitive science. Also, there are fundamental problems with the claim that cognitive theories are just algorithms. This artic-le discusses some of these problems and suggests that, instead of unified theories of cognition, specific me-chanisms for cognitive behavior in specific cognitive domains could be needed, with architectures that are tailor-made for specific forms of implementation. A sketch of such an architecture for language is presented, based on modifiable connection paths in small-world like network structures.