We study the bargaining game between a tax agency and a tax advisor-taxpayer team. Specifically, we focus on the factors that motivate tax aggressiveness, and the role of tax advisors in tax aggressiveness. We begin by characterizing the conditions under which tax advisors would give aggressive advice to their clients. Next, we analyze the optimal number of bargaining rounds for the tax agency. Third, we study the counteroffers that the tax agency makes in each round of the bargaining game. In addition, we investigate the conditions under which a high-tax taxpayer type would hire a reputable tax adviser. Last, we analyze when would the taxpayer accept or reject the tax advisor's recommendation.
机构:
Georgetown Univ, Ctr Law, Jurisprudence, Washington, DC 20057 USA
Georgetown Univ, Ctr Law, Ctr Study Legal Profess, Washington, DC 20057 USAGeorgetown Univ, Ctr Law, Jurisprudence, Washington, DC 20057 USA
机构:
Univ Illinois, Gies Coll Business, Champaign, IL USA
Univ Illinois, Gies Coll Business, 1206 S Sixth St,MC-706, Champaign, IL 61820 USAUniv Illinois, Gies Coll Business, Champaign, IL USA
Donohoe, Michael P.
Gale, Brian T.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Washington, Foster Sch Business, Seattle, WA USAUniv Illinois, Gies Coll Business, Champaign, IL USA
Gale, Brian T.
Mayberry, Michael A.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Florida, Fisher Sch Accounting, Gainesville, FL USAUniv Illinois, Gies Coll Business, Champaign, IL USA