Open banking: Credit market competition when borrowers own the data

被引:39
|
作者
He, Zhiguo [1 ,2 ]
Huang, Jing [3 ]
Zhou, Jidong [4 ]
机构
[1] Univ Chicago, Booth Sch Business, 5807 S Woodlawn Ave, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
[2] Natl Bur Econ Res, 1050 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Texas A&M Univ, Mays Business Sch, College Stn, TX 77843 USA
[4] Yale Univ, Sch Management, 165 Whitney Ave, New Haven, CT 06511 USA
关键词
Open banking; Data sharing; Banking competition; Digital economy; Winner?s curse; Privacy; COMMON VALUE AUCTIONS; ADVERSE SELECTION; INFORMATION; TECHNOLOGY; DISRUPTION; DISPERSION; FINTECH; ENTRY; MODEL;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2022.12.003
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Open banking facilitates data sharing consented to by customers who generate the data, with the regulatory goal of promoting competition between traditional banks and chal-lenger fintech entrants. We study lending market competition when sharing banks' cus-tomer transaction data enables better borrower screening for fintechs. Open banking pro-motes competition if it helps level the playing field for all lenders in screening borrowers; however, if it over-empowers fintechs, it can also hinder competition and leave all borrow-ers worse off. Due to the credit quality inference from borrowers' sign-up decisions, this remains true even if borrowers have the control of whether to share their banking data. We also study extensions with fintech affinities and data sharing on borrower preferences. (c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:449 / 474
页数:26
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