Regulatory costs of being public: Evidence from bunching estimation

被引:4
|
作者
Ewens, Michael [1 ,2 ]
Xiao, Kairong [1 ]
Xu, Ting [3 ]
机构
[1] Columbia Business Sch, New York, NY 10027 USA
[2] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
[3] Univ Toronto, Rotman Sch Management, Toronto, ON, Canada
关键词
Costs of being public; Bunching estimator; Capital market regulation; Disappearing public firms; SARBANES-OXLEY ACT; GOING-PRIVATE; OPTIMIZATION FRICTIONS; ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES; JOBS ACT; FIRMS; ELASTICITIES; BUYOUTS; CORPORATION; DISCLOSURE;
D O I
10.1016/j.jfineco.2023.103775
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We quantify the costs of major disclosure and governance regulations by exploiting a regulatory quirk: many rules trigger when a firm's public float exceeds a threshold. Consistent with firms avoiding costly regulation, we document significant bunching around three major regulatory thresholds. Estimations reveal that the three examined rules' compliance costs range from 1.2% to 1.8% of market capitalization for firms near thresholds. For a median U.S. public company, total costs amount to 4.3% of market capitalization, and at least 2.3% absent regulatory avoidance frictions. These cost estimates are robust across various extrapolation assumptions, ranging from 2.1% to 6.3% of market capitalization. Regulatory costs have a greater impact on private firms' IPO decisions than on public firms' going private decisions, but such costs only explain a small part of the decline in the number of public firms.
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页数:22
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