Risk-Limiting Audits for Condorcet Elections

被引:0
|
作者
Blom, Michelle [1 ]
Stuckey, Peter J. [2 ]
Teague, Vanessa [3 ,4 ]
Vukcevic, Damjan [5 ]
机构
[1] Univ Melbourne, Sch Comp & Informat Syst, Parkville, Australia
[2] Monash Univ, Dept Data Sci & AI, Clayton, Australia
[3] Thinking Cybersecur Pty Ltd, Melbourne, Australia
[4] Australian Natl Univ, Canberra, Australia
[5] Monash Univ, Dept Econometr & Business Stat, Clayton, Australia
来源
FINANCIAL CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY. FC 2023 INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOPS, FC 2023 | 2024年 / 13953卷
基金
澳大利亚研究理事会;
关键词
Condorcet Elections; Risk-Limiting Audits; Instant-Runoff Voting; Ranked Pairs;
D O I
10.1007/978-3-031-48806-1_6
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Elections where electors rank the candidates (or a subset of the candidates) in order of preference allow the collection of more information about the electors' intent. The most widely used election of this type is Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV), where candidates are eliminated one by one, until a single candidate holds the majority of the remaining ballots. Condorcet elections treat the election as a set of simultaneous decisions about each pair of candidates. The Condorcet winner is the candidate who beats all others in these pairwise contests. There are various proposals to determine a winner if no Condorcet winner exists. In this paper we show how we can efficiently audit Condorcet elections for a number of variations. We also compare the audit efficiency (how many ballots we expect to sample) of IRV and Condorcet elections.
引用
收藏
页码:79 / 94
页数:16
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