Evolutionary game analysis of the impact of dynamic dual credit policy on new energy vehicles after subsidy cancellation

被引:32
|
作者
Jin, Tao [1 ]
Jiang, Yulian [2 ]
Liu, Xingwen [2 ]
机构
[1] Southwest Minzu Univ, Coll Elect Engn, Key Lab Elect Informat State Ethn Affairs Commiss, Chengdu 610041, Sichuan, Peoples R China
[2] Southwest Minzu Univ, Coll Elect Engn, Chengdu 610041, Sichuan, Peoples R China
关键词
New energy vehicles; Dual credit policy; Evolutionary game theory; System dynamics; Hotelling; ELECTRIC VEHICLES; STRATEGIES; SIMULATION; BEHAVIOR; GREEN;
D O I
10.1016/j.amc.2022.127677
中图分类号
O29 [应用数学];
学科分类号
070104 ;
摘要
To discuss how to promote the rapid development of new energy vehicles (NEVs) through low regulatory costs after the removal of financial subsidies, in this paper, an evolution-ary game model between local governments and vehicle manufacturers is developed. In the model, we suppose a series of parameters based on academic research and practical situations. Then the model and its parameters are analyzed and verified by system dy-namics simulation. The study shows that: (1) Compared with the static, the dynamic dual credit policy enables the system to have an equilibrium stability point, which helps the development of NEVs. (2) The cost of local government regulation is reduced by the effec-tive implementation of the dynamic dual credit policy. (3) After the removal of financial subsidies, consumers focus on personal experience. Therefore, government and enterprises should focus on technological breakthroughs and infrastructure development.(c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页数:14
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Subsidy policy or dual-credit policy? Evolutionary game analysis of green methanol vehicles promotion
    Jia, Tingwen
    Li, Chengjiang
    Wang, Honglei
    Hu, Yu-jie
    Wang, Shiyuan
    Xu, Guoteng
    Hoang, Anh Tuan
    ENERGY, 2024, 293
  • [2] Analysis on the Tripartite Game of New Energy Vehicle Manufacturers Considering the Impact of Dual Credit Policy in the Context of Dual Carbon
    Miao Q.
    Lu J.
    Yue H.
    Journal of Engineering Science and Technology Review, 2023, 16 (04) : 53 - 65
  • [3] Impact of dual credit policy on new energy vehicles technology innovation with information asymmetry
    Ma, Miaomiao
    Meng, Weidong
    Li, Yuyu
    Huang, Bo
    APPLIED ENERGY, 2023, 332
  • [4] An evolutionary game analysis of new energy vehicles promotion considering carbon tax in post-subsidy era
    Liao, Dongsheng
    Tan, Binbin
    ENERGY, 2023, 264
  • [5] A time-delayed evolutionary game analysis of new energy vehicles development considering subsidy and carbon tax
    Liu, Chunfeng
    Liu, Zixin
    Li, Wenfang
    Xu, Mengzhu
    HELIYON, 2024, 10 (03)
  • [6] Effects of dual-credit policy and subsidy cancellation on decisions in an automotive supply chain
    Ding, Lian
    Zhu, Xiaodong
    Qiu, Yuzhuo
    JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION, 2023, 427
  • [7] Greenness-based subsidy and dual credit policy to promote new energy vehicles considering consumers' low-carbon awareness
    Xiao, Lu
    Chen, Zhen-Song
    Hou, Rui
    Mardani, Abbas
    Skibniewski, Miroslaw J.
    COMPUTERS & INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING, 2023, 185
  • [8] Evolutionary Game Analysis of Abandoned-Bike-Sharing Recycling: Impact of Recycling Subsidy Policy
    Liu, Limei
    Liu, Zhe
    Yang, Yi
    Shi, Biao
    Liu, Xingbao
    SUSTAINABILITY, 2023, 15 (11)
  • [9] A coordination analysis of stakeholder interests on the new subsidy policy of hydrogen fuel cell vehicles in China: From the perspective of the evolutionary game theory
    Huang Tuofu
    Hu Changhao
    He Qingyun
    Yang Dongxiao
    He Tian
    Fu Yi
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HYDROGEN ENERGY, 2022, 47 (58) : 24493 - 24510
  • [10] Evolutionary game analysis on the implementation of subsidy policy for sustainable transportation development
    Zhang, Linling
    Long, Ruyin
    Huang, Zheng
    Li, Wenbo
    Wei, Jia
    JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION, 2020, 267