Popular critical matchings in the many-to-many setting

被引:0
|
作者
Nasre, Meghana [1 ]
Nimbhorkar, Prajakta [2 ]
Ranjan, Keshav [1 ]
Sarkar, Ankita [3 ]
机构
[1] IIT Madras, Dept CSE, Chennai 600036, Tamil Nadu, India
[2] Chennai Math Inst & UMI ReLaX, Dept CSE, Chennai 603103, Tamilnadu, India
[3] Dartmouth Coll, Dept Comp Sci, Hanover, NH 03755 USA
关键词
Matching; Many-to-many; Lower quotas; Two-sided preferences; Popular; Critical; MARRIAGE; STABILITY;
D O I
10.1016/j.tcs.2023.114281
中图分类号
TP301 [理论、方法];
学科分类号
081202 ;
摘要
We consider the many-to-many bipartite matching problem in the presence of two-sided preferences and two-sided lower quotas. The input to our problem is a bipartite graph G = (a boolean OR B, E), where each vertex in A boolean OR B. specifies a strict preference ordering over its neighbours. Each vertex has an upper quota denoting the maximum number of vertices that can be assigned to it. In addition, each vertex has a lower quota denoting the minimum number of vertices that need to be assigned to it. In the many-to-many setting with two-sided lower quotas, informally, a critical matching is a matching which fulfils vertex lower quotas to the maximum possible extent. This is a natural generalization of the definition of critical matching in the one-to-one setting considered by Kavitha (FSTTCS 2021). In this work, our goal is to find a popular matching in the set of critical matchings. A matching is popular in a given set of matchings if it remains undefeated in a head-to-head election with any matching in that set. Here, vertices cast votes between pairs of matchings. We show that there always exists a matching that is popular in the set of critical matchings. We present an efficient algorithm to compute such a matching of the largest size. We prove the popularity of our matching using a dual certificate.
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页数:23
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