Safe asset demand increases loan risk. This arises in a competitive model in which securitization vehicles create safe assets by pooling loan payoffs purchased from loan originators. Equity investors allocate their wealth between originators, who need skin-in-the-game due to moral hazard, and vehicles, who need loss-absorption capacity against aggregate risk. An increase in demand for safety fosters safe asset creation through a securitization boom: originators sell more of their loan payoffs to vehicles, equity is reallocated from originators to vehicles, and the two effects contribute to an increase in loan risk. The model is consistent with a broad set of facts in the run-up to the Global Financial Crisis.(c) 2023 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
机构:
Univ Chicago, Booth Sch Business, 5807 South Woodlawn Ave, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USAUniv Chicago, Booth Sch Business, 5807 South Woodlawn Ave, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
He, Zhiguo
Krishnamurthy, Arvind
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机构:
NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Stanford Univ, Grad Sch Business, 655 Knight Way, Stanford, CA 94305 USAUniv Chicago, Booth Sch Business, 5807 South Woodlawn Ave, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
Krishnamurthy, Arvind
Milbradt, Konstantin
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h-index: 0
机构:
NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA
Northwestern Univ, Kellogg Sch Management, 2211 Campus Dr, Evanston, IL 60208 USAUniv Chicago, Booth Sch Business, 5807 South Woodlawn Ave, Chicago, IL 60637 USA
Milbradt, Konstantin
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW,
2019,
109
(04):
: 1230
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1262