Expected subjective value theory (ESVT): A representation of decision under risk and certainty

被引:8
|
作者
Glimcher, Paul W. [1 ]
Tymula, Agnieszka A. [2 ]
机构
[1] NYU, Neurosci Inst, Sch Med, 435 East 30th St, 11th Floor, New York, NY 10016 USA
[2] Univ Sydney, Sch Econ, A02, Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia
基金
澳大利亚研究理事会;
关键词
Utility; Decision-making; Expectation; Neuroeconomics; Normalization model; REWARD PREDICTION ERROR; PROSPECT-THEORY; DIVISIVE NORMALIZATION; ORBITOFRONTAL CORTEX; LOSS AVERSION; GAIN-CONTROL; PROBABILITY; CHOICE; VALUATION; CONTRAST;
D O I
10.1016/j.jebo.2022.12.013
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We present a descriptive model of choice derived from neuroscientific models of efficient value representation in the brain. Our basic model, a special case of Expected Utility The-ory, can capture a number of behaviors predicted by Prospect Theory. It achieves this with only two parameters: a time-indexed "payoff expectation" (reference point) and a free pa-rameter we call "predisposition". A simple extension of the model outside the domain of Expected Utility also captures the Allais Paradox. Our models shed new light on the com-putational origins and evolution of risk attitudes and aversion to outcomes below reward expectation (reference point). It delivers novel explanations of the endowment effect, the observed heterogeneity in probability weighting functions, and the Allais Paradox, all with fewer parameters and higher descriptive accuracy than Prospect Theory.(c) 2023 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:110 / 128
页数:19
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