Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese-English auction

被引：1

作者：

Goncalves, Ricardo ^{[1
,2
]}

Ray, Indrajit ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Catolica Portuguesa, Catolica Porto Business Sch, Rua Diogo Botelho 1327, P-4169005 Porto, Portugal

[2] Univ Catolica Portuguesa, CEGE, Rua Diogo Botelho 1327, P-4169005 Porto, Portugal

[3] Cardiff Univ, Cardiff Business Sch, Econ Sect, Colum Dr, Cardiff CF10 3EU, Wales

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC DESIGN | 2024年 / 28卷 / 01期

关键词：

Japanese-English auctions; Wallet game; Discrete bids; Partitions; Pooling equilibrium; Separating equilibrium; Seller's revenue; DUTCH AUCTIONS; WALLET GAME; DESIGN;

D O I：

10.1007/s10058-023-00337-7

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We consider the set-up of a Japanese-English auction with exogenously fixed discrete bid levels for a specific game (the wallet game with two bidders, following Goncalves and Ray in Econ Lett 159:177-179, 2017). We show that in this auction, partition equilibria exist that may be separating or pooling. We illustrate separating and pooling equilibria in games with two and three discrete bid levels and compare the revenues of the seller from these equilibria to find the optimal bid levels for these cases.

引用

页码：125 / 150

页数：26

共 5 条

[1] Revenue implications of choosing discrete bid levels in a Japanese–English auction
Ricardo Gonçalves
Indrajit Ray
Review of Economic Design, 2024, 28 : 125 - 150
[2] A genetic algorithm approach for auction design with discrete bid levels
Sun, Caihong
Chen, Yu
Sixth Wuhan International Conference on E-Business, Vols 1-4: MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL WORLD, 2007, : 750 - 755
[3] Revenue-maximizing Dutch auctions with discrete bid levels
Li, Zhen
Kuo, Ching-Chung
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH, 2011, 215 (03) : 721 - 729
[4] Optimal design of English auctions with discrete bid levels
David, Esther
Rogers, Alex
Jennings, Nicholas R.
Schiff, Jeremy
Kraus, Sarit
Rothkopf, Michael. H.
ACM TRANSACTIONS ON INTERNET TECHNOLOGY, 2007, 7 (02)
[5] Learning environmental parameters for the design of optimal English auctions with discrete bid levels
Rogers, A.
David, E.
Schiff, J.
Kraus, S.
Jennings, N. R.
AGENT-MEDIATED ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: DESIGNING TRADING AGENTS AND MECHANISMS, 2006, 3937 : 1 - 15

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