共 2 条
When Do Shareholder Agreements Add Value? Mitigating Superprincipal-Agency Conflicts in Family Firms
被引:0
|作者:
Jaskiewicz, Peter
[1
,5
]
Belot, Francois
[2
]
Combs, James G.
[1
,3
]
Boutron, Emmanuel
[4
]
Barredy, Celine
[4
]
机构:
[1] Univ Ottawa, Telfer Sch Management, Ottawa, ON, Canada
[2] Univ Paris 09, Univ PSL, CNRS, DRM, F-75016 Paris, France
[3] Univ Cent Florida, Coll Business, Orlando, FL USA
[4] Univ Paris Nanterre, CEROS, Nanterre, Ile De France, France
[5] Univ Ottawa, Telfer Sch Management, 55 Laurier Ave, Ottawa, ON K1N 6N5, Canada
关键词:
family business;
manuscripts: specialty areas;
agency;
theory;
quantitative;
research methods;
SOCIOEMOTIONAL WEALTH;
OWNERSHIP DISPERSION;
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;
MARKET VALUATION;
PERFORMANCE;
MANAGEMENT;
IMPACT;
COSTS;
DETERMINANTS;
ENDOGENEITY;
D O I:
10.1177/10422587241238006
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
Researchers are divided on whether shareholder agreements (SAs) improve or hurt firm value. We offer family firms as a context where SAs add value and explain why; SAs limit "superprincipal" agency conflicts between family owners and other family members. A panel of French firms and a second study of French Initial Public Offerings show shareholders value SAs more in family than in nonfamily firms. Among family firms, SAs add greater value when weak governance undermines family owners' resistance to other family members' demands. Our study helps reconcile competing theory about SAs and distinguishes superprincipal conflicts from other family-firm agency problems.
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页码:1451 / 1494
页数:44
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