CEO labor market and R&D investment in high-technology firms: an empirical study on the disciplinary effect of CEO labor market

被引：7
|
作者：
Seo, Jeongil [1 ]
Lee, Gyeonghwan [2 ]
Park, Choelsoon [3 ]
机构：
[1] Sogang Univ, Sogang Business Sch, 35 Baekbeom Ro, Seoul 04107, South Korea
[2] Dong A Univ, Dept Business Adm, 225 Gudeok Ro, Busan 49236, South Korea
[3] Seoul Natl Univ, Coll Business Adm, 1 Gwanak Ro, Seoul 08826, South Korea
来源：
JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT & ORGANIZATION | 2023年 / 29卷 / 01期
关键词：
Agency theory; CEO labor market; corporate governance; R&D investment; MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES; EXECUTIVE-COMPENSATION; INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS; CORPORATE PERFORMANCE; OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE; MODERATING ROLE; STOCK-OPTIONS; AGENCY THEORY; RISK-TAKING; PAY GAP;
D O I：
10.1017/jmo.2022.5
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号：
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
Previous corporate governance research has paid little attention to the role of chief executive officer (CEO) labor markets in controlling CEO behaviors because the CEO labor market has been considered inefficient. With the increasing mobility of top executives across firms, however, the potential of CEO labor markets to serve as an external disciplining force has been growing. In this study, we argue that CEOs will be more pressured to engage in desirable behaviors as the CEO labor market becomes more efficient. Using a longitudinal sample of S&P 1500 firms in high-technology industries in United States from 2011 to 2019, we found that CEOs tend to increase R&D investment as CEO labor market supply increases. We also found that the tendency is greater when external CEO succession is more frequent in the market. Our results demonstrate that CEO labor markets have the potential to function as an effective external governance mechanism.
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页码：30 / 47
页数：18
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