Towards a Historically Bounded Rationality: Herbert A. Simon's Critique of the Neoclassical Notion of Rational Agent

This article presents Herbert A. Simon's critique of the two basic assumptions of the neoclassical notion of agent: perfect ra-tionality and self-interest. It shows how Simon criticized both as-sumptions by recognizing that the cognitive capacities of agents are limited, showing that there are specific problems that do not have optimal solutions and that there are other motivations ir-reducible to self-interest, such as loyalty and group identifica-tion, which are fundamental for understanding the behavior of organizations. It is shown how Simon pointed towards a notion of rationality that is historically bounded by the interaction of the agent with its environment, which presents a complex and dynamic vision of human behavior. However, the article also shows the difficulties Simon had in achieving the full realiza-tion of this project by assuming an assumption of individualistic cognition that prevented him from giving a more substantive role to the environment in structuring agents' behaviors. It ends by showing how the notion of habit can give a more substantive role to the environment in order to develop a historically bound-ed conception of rationality.