Institutional investors' corporate site visits and corporate investment efficiency

This study examines the association between institutional investors' corporate site visits (CSVs) and the visited firms' investment efficiency. Using unique CSVs' data from China, this study provides empirical evidence that institutional investors' CSVs lessen the visited firms' corporate investment inefficiency, including both over- and underinvestment. The negative relationship between CSVs and investment inefficiency is less pronounced for firms with higher quality financial reporting and better corporate governance. In addition, CSVs show a decrease in corporate overinvestment by monitoring the risk-taking activities of younger CEOs and expansionary firms, and supervising the use of excess free cash flows. Meanwhile, CSVs could mitigate underinvestment by reducing managerial shirking from entrenched CEOs, such as dual or longer-tenured CEOs. The possible economic mechanism behind this association is that CSVs increase institutional shareholding percentages. All the main findings are robust to a battery of endogeneity and robustness tests.