Assessment moral hazard of crop insurance in Indonesia

被引:0
|
作者
Suryanto [1 ,3 ]
Rosalia, Amelia Choya Tia [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Sebelas Maret, Jalan Ir Sutami 36 A, Surakarta, Indonesia
[2] Univ Negeri Semarang, Semarang, Indonesia
[3] Univ Sebelas Maret, Ctr Envirom Res, Surakarta, Indonesia
关键词
FOOD SECURITY; DECISION; DROUGHT; VULNERABILITY; IMPACTS; RISK;
D O I
10.1088/1755-1315/1180/1/012035
中图分类号
S [农业科学];
学科分类号
09 ;
摘要
Moral hazard is crucial issue in insurance not only in developing countries but also in developed countries. This research is to find out the cause of moral hazard on the implementation of crop insurance in Indonesia. To support farmers in risk management and prevent financial losses the Indonesian government subsidizes crop insurance by paying 80% of the premiums. This study asked to farmer as primary data in Karanganyar Regency, Central Java. The result indicates that landholding size, farming experience, age, study experience, income, and farmers' participation in crop insurance influence the farmers' production cost. While farming and study experience has no significant influence on production cost. This study found that there is a risk of moral hazard when farmers are covered by crop insurance. This means that farmers will not take the necessary precautions to protect their crops, leading to greater losses.
引用
收藏
页数:11
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Moral hazard and subsidized crop insurance
    Wu, Shenan
    Goodwin, Barry K.
    Coble, Keith
    AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, 2020, 51 (01) : 131 - 142
  • [2] Crop insurance, moral hazard, and agricultural chemical use
    Smith, VH
    Goodwin, BK
    AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, 1996, 78 (02) : 428 - 438
  • [3] MORAL HAZARD CYCLES IN INDIVIDUAL-COVERAGE CROP INSURANCE
    VERCAMMEN, J
    VANKOOTEN, GC
    AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, 1994, 76 (02) : 250 - 261
  • [4] CROP INSURANCE AND CROP PRODUCTION - AN EMPIRICAL-STUDY OF MORAL HAZARD AND ADVERSE SELECTION
    QUIGGIN, J
    KARAGIANNIS, G
    STANTON, J
    AUSTRALIAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, 1993, 37 (02): : 95 - 113
  • [5] Costly yield verification, moral hazard, and crop insurance contract form
    Hyde, CE
    Vercammen, JA
    JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, 1997, 48 (03) : 393 - 407
  • [6] An expected-indemnity approach to the measurement of moral hazard in crop insurance
    Coble, KH
    Knight, TO
    Pope, RD
    Williams, JR
    AMERICAN JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, 1997, 79 (01) : 216 - 226
  • [7] MORAL HAZARD AND INSURANCE
    SHAVELL, S
    QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1979, 93 (04): : 541 - 562
  • [8] Estimating the extent of moral hazard in crop insurance using administrative data
    Roberts, Michael J.
    Key, Nigel
    O'Donoghue, Erik
    REVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, 2006, 28 (03): : 381 - 390
  • [9] The potential for moral hazard behavior in irrigation decisions under crop insurance
    Suchato, Paloch
    Mieno, Taro
    Schoengold, Karina
    Foster, Timothy
    AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS, 2022, 53 (02) : 257 - 273
  • [10] Moral Hazard Analysis for Crop Yield Insurance Using Loss Prevention Model
    Simsek, Guven
    Yildirak, Kasirga
    SOSYOEKONOMI, 2025, 33 (63) : 87 - 102