The Puzzle of Evaluating Moral Cognition in Artificial Agents

被引:4
|
作者
Reinecke, Madeline G. [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Mao, Yiran [1 ,4 ]
Kunesch, Markus [1 ]
Duenez-Guzman, Edgar A. [1 ]
Haas, Julia [1 ]
Leibo, Joel Z. [1 ]
机构
[1] Google DeepMind, London, England
[2] Yale Univ, Dept Psychol, New Haven, CT USA
[3] Yale Univ, Dept Psychol, 100 Coll St, New Haven, CT 06510 USA
[4] Google Deep Mind, London N1C 4DN, England
关键词
Moral cognition; Artificial intelligence; Multi-agent reinforcement learning; JUDGMENTS; INTENT;
D O I
10.1111/cogs.13315
中图分类号
B84 [心理学];
学科分类号
04 ; 0402 ;
摘要
In developing artificial intelligence (AI), researchers often benchmark against human performance as a measure of progress. Is this kind of comparison possible for moral cognition? Given that human moral judgment often hinges on intangible properties like "intention" which may have no natural analog in artificial agents, it may prove difficult to design a "like-for-like" comparison between the moral behavior of artificial and human agents. What would a measure of moral behavior for both humans and AI look like? We unravel the complexity of this question by discussing examples within reinforcement learning and generative AI, and we examine how the puzzle of evaluating artificial agents' moral cognition remains open for further investigation within cognitive science.
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页数:7
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