Data on how abundance of resource inflows and punishment types affect resource extraction behavior

The data is collected through laboratory experiments on a dynamic common pool resource game, where, in an infinitely repeated number of rounds (i.e., game ended randomly), in- dividuals made decisions about whether to exert a high or a low effort level to extract resources. Experiments were conducted using the student sample (consent provided and ethics approved) at the University of HawaiModified Letter Turned Commai at Ma over bar noa. A total of 8 sessions, 2 for each of the 4 treatments, were run with exactly 20 participants within a session. Individu- als made decisions in groups of 10. Communication between any participant was not allowed. A session is randomly as- signed (1) to vary whether the inflow of resources at the be- ginning of each round is high or low, and (2) to allow partic- ipants to either financially punish or socially punish defec- tors. A financial punishment resulted to a loss in profit for the punished while a social punishment displayed the words "You have extracted too much! You're being greedy!" on the computer screen of the punished. Individuals were assigned subject ID numbers and interacted using their subject IDs. The data is useful in understanding how resource inflow and type of punishment affects individual resource extraction be- havior. The data could also be combined with other publicly available common pool resource datasets for a meta-analysis on individual behavior in the commons. (c) 2023 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)