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ESG reputation risks, cash holdings, and payout policies
被引:14
|作者:
Wong, Jin Boon
[1
]
Zhang, Qin
[1
]
机构:
[1] Macquarie Univ, Sydney, NSW 2109, Australia
关键词:
ESG;
Reputation risks;
Information asymmetry;
Cash;
Payout policy;
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE;
CAPITAL-MARKETS;
AGENCY PROBLEMS;
EXCESS CASH;
INFORMATION;
DISCLOSURE;
COST;
FIRM;
LIQUIDITY;
D O I:
10.1016/j.frl.2023.104695
中图分类号:
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号:
0202 ;
摘要:
This paper examines the financial implications of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) reputational risks and evaluates if excessive cash holdings and corporate payout policies can play influential roles in firm valuation by investors. We find empirical evidence suggesting that when ESG reputational risks intensify, investors particularly penalize the stock price of firms with excessive or high cash levels. This effect is particularly pronounced when managers do not employ any form of corporate payout policies. It is observed that cash distributions in the form of dividend payments or share repurchases may help mitigate shareholders' antipathy to excessive and high cash holdings. Further analysis reveals that investors may view refinancing risks as a positive moderating factor for high levels of cash holdings during negative ESG shocks.
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页数:12
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