董事会中的不同声音:非控股股东董事的监督动机与监督效果

被引：44

作者：

祝继高 ^{[1
]}

李天时 ^{[2
]}

YANG Tianxia ^{[3
]}

机构：

[1] 对外经济贸易大学国际商学院

[2] 首都经济贸易大学会计学院

[3] 美国南佛罗里达大学商学院

来源：

经济研究 | 2021年 / 56卷 / 05期

关键词：

非控股股东董事; 董事投票; 监督动机; 监督效果;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F271 [企业体制]; F832.51 [];

学科分类号：

1202 ; 120202 ; 1201 ; 020204 ;

摘要：

本文利用中国强制披露的上市公司董事投票数据,分析了非控股股东董事的监督动机和监督效果。研究发现,非控股股东董事倾向于对与非控股股东利益联系紧密的董事会议案投非赞成票。并且,持股比例较高的非控股股东派出的董事和未在上市公司领取薪酬的非控股股东董事更倾向于投非赞成票。通过检验非控股股东董事投非赞成票的监督效果,本文发现,非控股股东董事投非赞成票能降低上市公司的代理成本、提高上市公司的经营效率和企业价值。进一步研究发现,非控股股东董事的监督对独立董事履行监督职能具有溢出效应,且这一效应在经营风险较高的公司中,以及当独立董事和非控股股东董事的职业背景相似时更显著。本文的研究对于进一步提高董事会治理效率、深化混合所有制改革和完善中国特色现代企业制度具有积极的启示。

引用

页码：180 / 198

页数：19

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