提升监管强度具有风险抑制效应吗?——来自中国银行业的经验证据

被引:62
|
作者
潘敏
魏海瑞
机构
[1] 武汉大学经济发展研究中心/经济与管理学院
关键词
监管强度; 商业银行风险承担; 监管流程;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F832.3 [金融组织、银行];
学科分类号
摘要
本文从事前、事中和事后监管的监管流程角度出发,运用我国71家商业银行2003年至2013年的非平衡面板数据,实证检验了监管强度提升对商业银行风险承担行为的影响。研究表明,相较于事中现场审查而言,银行业监管部门事前发布监管公文和事后违规惩戒措施实施强度提升的风险抑制效应更为明显。监管强度提升的风险抑制效应对大银行和国有控股商业银行的作用普遍更强。但对于上市银行和非上市银行的影响则存在差异,其中,监管公文发布对上市银行风险承担的抑制效应要弱于非上市银行,而违规惩戒措施的效果与之相反,现场审查对上市、非上市银行的影响则不存在显著差异。
引用
收藏
页码:64 / 80
页数:17
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