国有资本参股何以影响民营企业现金持有?——基于合作优势和竞争制衡的双重视角

被引:54
作者
曾敏 [1 ]
李常青 [2 ]
李宇坤 [3 ]
机构
[1] 中国社会科学院财经战略研究院
[2] 厦门大学管理学院
[3] 陕西师范大学国际商学院
基金
国家自然科学基金重大项目;
关键词
现金持有; 混合所有制改革; 反向混改; 国有资本; 异质性股东;
D O I
10.19616/j.cnki.bmj.2022.04.008
中图分类号
F275 [企业财务管理]; F276.5 [私营企业]; F271 [企业体制];
学科分类号
1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要
基于“合作优势”和“竞争制衡”的双重视角,结合现金持有的“交易需求”“竞争效应”和“代理问题”假说,本文探讨了国有资本参股对于民营企业现金持有的影响。实证检验发现,国有资本参股可以显著提升民营企业的现金持有水平,该结论在经过一系列稳健性检验后仍然成立。机制分析发现,国有资本参股可以扩大民营企业的债务融资规模,进而使得后者有能力更多地增持现金以提升市场竞争力;国有资本参股可以缓解民营企业的“大股东-小股东”代理问题,抑制后者过度投资所造成的现金无谓耗散,继而增加现金持有水平。进一步研究发现,国有资本参股对现金持有的提升效应在处于竞争劣势的企业中更加显著,投资类股东参股对企业现金持有的提升作用更加显著,国有资本参股提升了企业的现金持有价值。本文拓展深化了股权结构领域的研究,丰富完善了“双向混改”的理论和对策研究,也印证了现金持有理论随着金融市场以及产品市场的发展在不断更新,新的理论具有更强的解释力。
引用
收藏
页码:134 / 152
页数:19
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