经理薪酬激励风险效应与风险治理研究述评

被引：4

作者：

黄再胜

机构：

[1] 南京政治学院上海分院

来源：

外国经济与管理 | 2012年 / 34卷 / 05期

关键词：

经理薪酬; 薪酬激励; 风险管理; 风险效应; 风险治理;

D O I：

10.16538/j.cnki.fem.2012.05.008

中图分类号：

F272 [企业计划与经营决策];

学科分类号：

1201 ;

摘要：

自2008年爆发国际金融危机以来,因薪酬激励不当而引发的与风险相关的代理问题(risk-related agency problem)及其治理,开始成为经理薪酬激励研究的新热点。本文在梳理相关文献的基础上,详细阐述了经理薪酬激励的风险效应和风险治理问题,以期为我国国企高管薪酬管理与规制提供借鉴与启示。

引用

页码：67 / 74

页数：8

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