纵向市场中的排他理论研究评述

被引:2
作者
李凯
司马林
冯飞
机构
[1] 东北大学工商管理学院
关键词
纵向市场; 纵向排他; 排他理论; 反垄断;
D O I
10.14007/j.cnki.cjpl.2018.03.004
中图分类号
F062.9 [产业经济学];
学科分类号
020205 ;
摘要
受近期国内外一些反垄断典型案例讨论的激发,纵向市场中的排他问题成为学者关注的焦点。促进纵向排他理论的进一步研究需对现有文献进行全面系统性的梳理。纵向排他行为既能够带来效率促进,也能够损害竞争,学术界对纵向排他行为的研究存在较大争议。从纵向排他的研究框架、典型竞争损害观点以及效率辩护等方面厘清和辨明当前纵向排他研究的理论脉络,审视其研究动态及研究进展,建构思想框架总结归纳现有研究贡献,既可发现现有研究的不足,也可拟合出未来研究的趋势方向,有助于促进纵向排他理论的深化以及我国相关反垄断实践。
引用
收藏
页码:47 / 56
页数:10
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