货币政策共识的演化及反思:来自金融危机的启示

被引：2

作者：

刘洪钟

杨攻研

机构：

[1] 辽宁大学国际关系学院

来源：

经济学动态 | 2013年 / 02期

关键词：

通货膨胀目标制; 中央银行; 资产价格泡沫; 宏观审慎政策;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F821.0 [货币政策];

学科分类号：

020101 ; 020203 ; 020204 ;

摘要：

自20世纪80年代以来,学术和实践领域均认为货币政策逐渐成为一门科学,并形成了一系列广为接受的"共识"。然而全球金融危机的出现使原本的货币政策共识遭到前所未有的抨击与挑战,货币政策理论与实践正处于变革的边缘。本文首先在长期视角下考察货币政策如何在世界范围内达成共识;其次追问在金融危机冲击下,货币政策共识的"变"与"不变";最后重新探讨呼之欲出的货币政策"新"共识。在当前全球经济增长的迷雾中希望国内外的研究能够为各国政策制定者带来些许启示。

引用

页码：140 / 147

页数：8

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