银行业竞争、特许权价值与风险承担研究述评

被引：6

作者：

吴秋实

李兆君

机构：

[1] 湖北大学商学院

来源：

中南财经政法大学学报 | 2010年 / 03期

关键词：

银行业竞争; 特许权价值; 风险承担; 金融自由化;

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F832.2 [银行制度与业务];

学科分类号：

1201 ; 020204 ;

摘要：

在银行业竞争日趋激烈的背景下,有必要深入探讨竞争与银行风险承担之间的关系,进而判断竞争对银行业整体稳定性的影响,以便为制定金融监管政策提供理论依据。在相关研究中,20世纪80年代的研究重点主要集中于探讨银行特许权价值与风险承担行为之间的内在关系,许可证价值假说是其中心命题;进入20世纪90年代后,随着金融中介理论的发展,研究重点逐渐转向以特许权价值为纽带,直接采用产业组织理论的研究方法,探讨竞争与银行业稳定性的关系,其中心命题是市场势力假说。

引用

页码：65 / 69

页数：5

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