论能力之知:为赖尔一辩

被引:32
作者
郁振华 [1 ,2 ]
机构
[1] 华东师范大学中国现代思想文化研究所
[2] 华东师范大学哲学系
关键词
威廉姆森; 斯坦利; 理智主义; 无穷倒退; 概念; 思维形式; 赖尔;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
B08 [哲学流派及其研究];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
Ryle holds that knowing how and knowing that are different in kind.Stanley and Williamson call Ryle's infinite regress argument against intellectualism into question,and claim that Ryle is wrong in taking know how as equivalent to ability,moreover,they argue that knowing how is a species of knowing that by appealing to some contemporary syntactic and semantic theories.This essay responds to these three challenges one by one on behalf of Ryle,and claims that Stanley and Williamson do not have an adequate understanding of Ryle's conception of knowing how.One can't dispense with the following three elements,namely,action,intelligence and ability to have a complete understanding of knowing how in Ryle's sense.Unfortunately,in each of these aspects,Stanley and Williamson go astray.
引用
收藏
页码:70 / 78+129 +129
页数:10
相关论文
共 2 条
[1]   道德、政治和知识:欧克肖特的盲点与洞见 [J].
郁振华 .
哲学研究, 2009, (04) :95-102
[2]   Amazing knowledge [J].
Schiffer, S .
JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, 2002, 99 (04) :200-202