The impact of institutional and managerial ownership on the pay-performance relationship: Evidence from JS']JSE-listed firms

This study explores how institutional and managerial ownership influence the connection between executive directors' pay and firm performance in South Africa. Employing panel linear regression models and Johnson-Neyman analysis, complex insights are revealed. This study revealed that institutional ownership acts as a double-edged sword, positively moderating the link between long-term and total incentive remuneration and Return on Assets (ROA), while negatively influencing the relationship with market-based metrics like Tobin's Q. This suggests that institutional shareholders play a dual role in enhancing long-term alignment and tempering short-term performance pressures. Managerial ownership also demonstrates mixed impacts, positively moderating the relationship between both short-term and total incentive remuneration, and ROA, but negatively moderating the link between long-term incentive remuneration and Total Shareholder Return (TSR). These findings underscore the delicate balance between managerial incentives, shareholder interests, and long-term value creation. While higher managerial ownership aligns with short-term shareholder goals, it may also lead to managerial entrenchment and short-termism in certain contexts. This study contributes to literature on corporate governance and executive remuneration in an emerging market setting.. By revealing the nuanced effects of institutional and managerial ownership on the pay-performance relationship, the paper provides valuable insights for policymakers, investors and corporate leaders aiming to improve governance practices and foster sustainable value creation. Our study offers essential implications for corporate governance practices and sets the stage for further inquiry into the intricate relationship between ownership structure, executive compensation, and firm performance.