Does Democracy Matter in Consociational Systems? Evidence from Bosnia and Herzegovina

Bosnia has one of the most complex consociational systems in the world, combining strict power-sharing at central institutions with a high degree of decentralization through a federal system, which gives most competences to the regional (entity) level. The country holds regular elections at different levels of governance, and has seen elite and party turn-over at local, cantonal, entity and national levels. Hence, in this sense, it qualifies as an electoral democracy. However, the change of elites and parties in power has not fundamentally changed Bosnian politics, which is still characterized by domination by a cartel of ethnic elites, ethnic outbidding across the political system, and a lack of fundamental reforms to the initial Dayton constitutional structure. This article will discuss to what extent elite turnover matters in strict consociational systems, and how consociationalism, as applied in Bosnia, can limit the effects of democratic change through elections.