Effect of Information Disclosure Policies in Conservation Auctions: Role of Landscape Configuration

被引:0
|
作者
Nguyen, Chi [1 ,2 ]
Latacz-Lohmann, Uwe [1 ,3 ]
机构
[1] Univ Kiel, Dept Agr Econ, Kiel, Germany
[2] Univ Western Australia, Ctr Environm Econ & Policy, Crawley, WA, Australia
[3] Univ Western Australia, Dept Agr & Resource Econ, Crawley, WA, Australia
关键词
TRANSACTION COSTS; ECOSYSTEM SERVICES; PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS; REVERSE AUCTIONS; RESERVE PROGRAM; PAYMENTS; QUALITY; REVELATION; BENEFITS; PURCHASE;
D O I
10.3368/le.101.1.032824-0031R
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This article uses controlled laboratory experiments to investigate the effect of revealing the spatial environmental scoring rule, which incorporates ecological gains from spatial coordination of conservation efforts, on auction performance across different landscape types. We set up a stylized agricultural landscape where the environmental goal was to connect fragmented wildlife habitats. We found that revealing the spatial environmental scoring rule effectively improves auction performance in the landscapes where environmental benefits and opportunity costs are uncorrelated or negatively correlated. However, the results warn against revealing the spatial environmental scoring rule in landscapes where benefits and costs are positively correlated.
引用
收藏
页码:119 / 140
页数:22
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