Game Theory-Based Trade-Off Analysis for Privacy and Openness in Decision Making by Controlling Quantity of Information

Privacy has long been considered a fundamental component of consumer services. Privacy decreases the possibility of consumers revealing confidential information in terms of customer service. However, it also refers to service pleasure, flexibility, and convenience. This study formally analyzes the trade-off between privacy and openness in financial services. Because if the consumer favors privacy above openness, they may have limited freedom in the service provider's service, and vice versa. As a result, it is critical to choose the optimum solution to balance the trade-off. In this paper, we used the bilateral conflict concept to analyze the trade-off problem to achieve Nash equilibrium by controlling the quantity of information. We demonstrated that Nash equilibrium can be reached if two requirements are satisfied: (i) there is inequality in benefits for both the information owner and the decision maker, and (ii) there is inequality in benefits just for the information owner.