The evolutionary dynamics of soft-max policy gradient in multi-agent settings

Policy gradient is one of the most famous algorithms in reinforcement learning. This paper studies the mean dynamics of the soft-max policy gradient algorithm and its properties in multi- agent settings by resorting to evolutionary game theory and dynamical system tools. Unlike most multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms, whose mean dynamics are a slight variant of the replicator dynamics not affecting the properties of the original dynamics, the soft-max policy gradient dynamics presents a structure significantly different from that of the replicator. In particular, we show that the soft-max policy gradient dynamics in a given game are equivalent to the replicator dynamics in an auxiliary game obtained by a non-convex transformation of the payoffs of the original game. Such a structure gives the dynamics several non-standard properties. The first property we study concerns the convergence to the best response. In particular, while the continuous-time mean dynamics always converge to the best response, the crucial question concerns the convergence speed. Precisely, we show that the space of initializations can be split into two complementary sets such that the trajectories initialized from points of the first set (said good initialization region) directly move to the best response. In contrast, those initialized from points of the second set (said bad initialization region) move first to a series of sub-optimal strategies and then to the best response. Interestingly, in multi-agent adversarial machine learning environments, we show that an adversary can exploit this property to make any current strategy of the learning agent using the soft-max policy gradient fall inside a bad initialization region, thus slowing its learning process and exploiting that policy. When the soft-max policy gradient dynamics is studied in multi-population games, modeling the learning dynamics in self-play, we show that the dynamics preserve the volume of the set of initial points. This property proves that the dynamics cannot converge when the only equilibrium of the game is fully mixed, as the volume of the set of initial points would need to shrink. We also give empirical evidence that the volume expands over time, suggesting that the dynamics in games with fully-mixed equilibrium is chaotic.