Does risk management moderate the relationship between CEO power and corporate philanthropy?Does risk management moderate the relationship between CEO power and corporate philanthropy?M. Adams et al.

被引：0
|
作者：
Mike Adams [1 ]
Wei Jiang [2 ]
Siqi Liu [3 ]
机构：
[1] University of Bath,School of Management
[2] University of Manchester,Alliance Manchester Business School
[3] The Open University Business School,Faculty of Business & Law
[4] The Open University,undefined
来源：
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting | 2025年 / 64卷 / 1期
关键词：
CEO power; Philanthropy; CSR; Risk management; Insurance; G22; G32; G34;
D O I：
10.1007/s11156-024-01298-w
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
By integrating upper echelons, agency, and stakeholder theories, we examine the relationship between CEO power and charitable cash donations. Utilizing a novel hand-collected dataset from the UK's insurance industry, our focus lies particularly on how risk management influences this relationship. We find that CEO power is positively related to charitable giving. However, alternative risk mitigation strategies play a moderating role in the CEO power-donations relationship, suggesting that in firms with alternative risk management strategies, CEOs are less likely to advocate for corporate giving as a method to mitigate business risks. Our results are robust to various endogeneity checks and alternative measures of CEO power. Our paper enriches the comprehension of the motives driving corporate philanthropy.
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页码：53 / 87
页数：34
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